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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I,

The appellant asserted in the district court that the

detention and subsequent searches violated Section 14, Article I,
of the Constitution of Utah as well as the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and cited the primary cases from
other jurisdictions he is relying upon in this court.
The difference between the way the Fourth Amendment
and Section 14, Article I is applied was not analyzed because the
cases where that difference developed had not been decided at
that time.
The
article

which

prosecutor

furnished

extensively

analyzed

the
the

district

court

application

of

an
the

Constitution of Utah to roadblocks.
Point II.

The issue of whether the roadblock was justified by

compelling public need and because it was properly regulated was
raised, in the first instance, by the prosecutor and by the
authorities

attached

to

the

prosecutor's

memorandum.

The

appellant did, in his opening memorandum in the district court
assert that the type of roadblock utilized in the instant case
would fail to meet the constitutional standards set out in State
v. Deskins. 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983).
The court below considered the analysis incorporated
in the authorities cited by the parties and expressly ruled on

the

issue

of whether the roadblock was justified by public

interest and planned to neutralize the officers1 discretion.
Point III;

Appellant expressly raised the issue of whether the

search of his luggage violated the Constitution of Utah because
of the lack of any circumstances coming within the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: APPELLANT ADEQUATELY RAISED THE
STATE CONSTITUTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT.
The

Brief

of

Appellee

asserts

appellantfs

that

Constitutional arguments were not adequately developed
court below.

State
in the

(Brief of Appellee at 6, 7, 14).

Appellant asserted that both the detention and subsequent
search

were

in violation

of

Section

14, Article

I of the

Constitution of Utah as well as the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution in his Motion to Suppress filed in the
district court.

(R-9).

Appellant did not indulge in an analysis of the difference
between

state

roadblocks

and

because,

federal
at

the

constitutional
time

protections

against

the matter was before the

district court, the difference had not yet developed.

The United

States Supreme Court did not hold that a properly regulated
2

roadblock was permissible under the Fourth Amendment to meet a
specified state law enforcement need until it did so in Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, 58 L.W. 4781 (June 14, 1990).
However, appellant did argue in his Memorandum in Support of
Motion

to

occurred

Suppress
as

a

that

result

of

the
the

seizure

of

roadblock

the

defendant

violated

which

Section

14,

Article I of the Constitution of Utah as well as the identically
worded Fourth Amendment and noted that:
It is note worthy that many of the
state courts which have held roadblocks spot
checks unconstitutional, have chosen to do so
under their state constitutions.
State v.
Smith, 694 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa.
Super. 1985); Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d
692 (Or. 1987); State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d
1057 (Ida. 1988).
Memorandum at 4 and note 2.

(R-16).

These cases are the primary

cases relied upon by appellant in his opening brief in Point I
and Point II.

See, Brief of Appellant at 16 and 2 4 - 2 7 .

were

now

and

are

no

reported

Utah

cases on the

roadblocks under the Constitution of Utah.
135 Utah Adv. Rep.

16

There

legality

of

State v. Larocco,

(Sup. Ct. May 29, 1990) which

applied

Section 14, Article I more stringently than the Fourth Amendment
to searches of vehicles was not argued

in the district

because it had not been decided at that point.
3

However, a

court

lengthy analysis of the application of the Constitution of Utah
to roadblocks appears in the Davis and Wallentine article,1 at
6-10, attached to the prosecutor's Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Suppress which was furnished to the district court
below.

The prosecutor's memorandum inexplicably does not appear

in the record and appellant is moving to supplement the record.

POINT II: THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE ROADBLOCK
VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY NEED NOR
PROPERLY REGULATED WAS ADDRESSED IN THE
DISTRICT COURT.
In Point III of his opening brief, appellant argued that,
assuming

the

statutory

authority

of

officers

to

conduct

roadblocks and the per se constitutional validity of roadblocks,
the

roadblock

in this

case was nonetheless

unconstitutional

because it was not justified by demonstrated need nor properly
regulated.
While appellant did not himself raise this issue directly in
the district court, the State did, citing State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 673 P. 2d 1174 (1983) and relying heavily on Davis and
Wallentine, The Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in

1

This is a draft of the article later published in an
updated version in 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 357 (1989).
4

Utah:

Public

Interests

Versus

Individual

Liberty2

and

the

Memorandum Decision of another district court judge in State v.
Sims, both of which were attached to the State's Memorandum.
Memorandum

in Opposition to Motion to Suppress at 3-6.

The

State's memorandum and its attachments inexplicably do not appear
in the record and appellant is now moving to supplement the
record with those documents.
Appellant, in his opening memorandum in the court below,
chose to put his primary emphasis on the lack of statutory
authority, however he did argue:
If the state legislature had given the
Highway Patrol such authority, and set out
standards, say the standards devised by
Sergeant Mangelson in his operation plan, it
would then be necessary to see if that
legislation met the standards for minimizing
the infringement of liberty of motorists and
the discretion of police officers. See, e.
g., Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
(R-3), and in footnote 1, appellant went on:
The defendants do not concede that the
type of roadblock used here, if authorized by
the Legislature, would past constitutional
muster for it would clearly not do so. See,
e. g., State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.
1983). For example, no reasonably effective
z

This was a draft of the article later published in an
updated version in 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 357 (1989) and cited
extensively in the Brief of Appellant.
5

prior notice of the roadblock was given to
protect privacy, and not all drivers were
questioned or required to produce their
papers.
Ibid.

In State v. Deskins, it was held that the proper analysis

for determining

the constitutionality

of a roadblock was to

balance "the degree of legitimate governmental interests against
the

resulting

included,

intrusion"

and

others,

"the

among

the

factors

degree

of

to

be

considered

discretion

left

to

officers in the field" and "standards set by superior officers."
673 P.2d at 1176.
In his Reply Memorandum, appellant argued:
None of the authority cited by the State
stands for the proposition, or even
suggests,that field officers can devise their
own criteria and controls for interfering
with the liberty of motorists . . .
(R-24).
It

is clear

analysis,

set

out

that the district court below applied the
in

State

v.

Deskins,

supra.,

Davis

and

Wallentine, supra.. 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 374-75, 379-80, and State v.
Sims, Memorandum Decision, Fourth District Court No. 151-D, at 56, balancing the need for the roadblock versus the intrusion on
liberty, which in turn is dependent upon "standards set by
superior officers" and "the degree of discretion, if any, left to
the officer in the field" among other factors.
6

The court below

concluded:
There now exists a history of escalating
drug traffic along the stretch of Interstate
15 where the roadblock in this case was
conducted. There have been numerous arrests
for drug violations in this area, and this
tends to legitimize the public interest in
predetermined checkpoints, systematically
pursued by officers to minimize the burden to
individual citizens without discretion to
engage in random roving stops.
With regard to issue number one, this
Court concludes and finds that the roadblock
in question was so planned and executed to
minimize the intrusion on the traveling
public's time and inconvenience, and was so
structured to neutralize the officers
unbridled discretion.
(i.e. all vehicles
except tractor-trailers and busses were
stopped.) Thus the stop of the defendant's
vehicle at the roadblock was a reasonable
seizure, not violating defendant's federal
Fourth Amendment rights or the defendant's
rights under Article One, Section 14 of the
Utah State Constitution.
(R-26, 32) (Emphasis added).
Thus it is clear that appellant is not raising an issue in
Point III of his opening brief which was not raised and decided
in the district court.

The State itself argued the other side of

the issue and furnished authority, which included most of the
authority now relied upon by appellant, and the court below ruled
upon that issue.

7

POINT III: APPELLANT PROPERLY RAISED THE
STATE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITION AGAINST
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES.
In his memorandum in the court below, appellant did raise
the same issue as that argued in Point IV of his opening brief
here, saying:
Since none of the recognized exceptions
for searching containers found in the search
of vehicles without obtaining a warrant were
present in this case, the evidence of what
was found in the luggage should be suppressed
under the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 14, Article I
of the Constitution of Utah, regardless of
whether the stop and detention of the
defendants or the search of the passenger
compartment were legal.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at p. 9.

(R-14, 22)

(Emphasis added).
State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Sup. Ct. , May 30,
1990)

applying

the

state

constitution's

warrant

clause

to

automobiles in the* absence of the recognized exceptions despite
the federal courts refusal to so apply the federal constitution,
was not cited in the court below because it had not yet been
decided.

Nonetheless, appellant did make the argument in the

district court that, regardless of the legality of the detention
and the search of the vehicle itself, a warrant to search the
suitcases was required under the Constitution of Utah since the
8

contents were outside the reach of the arrested persons and the
inventory

exception

was

neither

claimed

nor

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at 8-9.

applicable.
(R-21, 22).

CONCLUSION
All the issues which appellant seeks to have this court
decide were presented to the district court and the district
court decided them.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

lOlLy day of December, 1990.
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